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Winning the Battle against Inflation
OUR COUNTRY has been experiencing a
period of unusual prosperity, featured by
heavy spending, both governmental and pri-
vate. As a nation, we have been trying to
spend more than we earn through produc-
tion, and to invest at a rate faster than we
save. The resulting demands, strong and
incessant, have pressed hard upon our re-
sources, both human and material. In con-
sequence, prices have been rising, and the
purchasing power of the dollar has been
falling.
It is of the utmost importance to bring to
bear on this critical problem all of the in-
formation and intelligence that we can
muster. That is what you are seeking, and
that is why this opportunity to appear here
is timely and most welcome. We are not
facing a new, or insoluble problem—it is as
old as the invention of money—and history
is marked with both defeats and triumphs
in dealing with this invisible but deadly
enemy of inflation. The question is not
whether we can solve the problem, but how
best to deal with it under our form of gov-
ernment and free enterprise institutions.
Solve it we can—and must.
You have been inquiring particularly into
fiscal policies and it is equally important to
inquire into credit and monetary policies.
They are closely interrelated, and are the
two paramount and time tested means availa-
ble to the Government in combating infla-
NOTE.—Statement of William McChesney Martin,
Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Committee on Finance of
the United States Senate, Aug. 13, 1957.
tion. There are undeniably practical limita-
tions of timing and scope upon both, but
they are the most effective weapons in the
arsenal against this destructive invader. In
fact they are indispensable.
By way of preface and for the record I
should like to outline first the general struc-
ture and organization of the Federal Reserve
System. Then I want to go into the nature
and character of the problems the nation is
now facing.
FEDERAL RESERVE STRUCTURE
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was the
outgrowth of prolonged Congressional study
of the history of central banking in other
countries and of our own experience, partic-
ularly with the First and Second Banks of
the United States. The Congress, seeking to
avoid either political or private domination
of the money supply, created an independent
institution which is an ingenious blending of
public and private participation in the Sys-
tem's operations under the coordination of
a public body—the Federal Reserve Board
—here in Washington.
This question of "independence" has been
thoroughly debated throughout the long his-
tory of central banking. On numerous oc-
casions when amendments to the Federal
Reserve Act were under consideration the
question has been reexamined by Congress
and it has reaffirmed its original judgment
that the Reserve System should be independ-
ent—not independent of Government, but
independent within the structure of the Gov-
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ernment. That does not mean that the
reserve banking mechanism can or should
pursue a course that is contrary to the ob-
jectives of national economic policies. It
does mean that within its technical field, in
deciding upon and carrying out monetary
and credit policy, it shall be free to exercise
its best collective judgment independently.
The Reserve System is an instrument of
Government designed to foster and protect
the public interest, so far as that is possible
through the exercise of monetary powers.
Its basic objective is to assure a monetary
climate that permits economic growth to-
gether with stability in the value of our
money. Private citizens share in admin-
istering the System but, in so doing, they
are acting in a public capacity. The mem-
bers of the Board of Governors and the of-
ficers of the Federal Reserve Banks are in
a true sense public officials. The processes
of policy determination are surrounded with
carefully devised safeguards against domina-
tion by any special interest group.
Broadly, the Reserve System may be
likened to a trusteeship created by Congress
to administer the nation's credit and mone-
tary affairs—a trusteeship dedicated to help-
ing safeguard the integrity of the currency.
Confidence in the value of the dollar is vital
to continued economic progress and to the
preservation of the social values at the heart
of free institutions.
The Federal Reserve Act is, so to speak,
a trust indenture that the Congress can alter
or amend as it thinks best. The existing
System is by no means perfect, but experi-
ence prior to 1914 suggests that either it or
something closely approximating it is indis-
pensable. In its present form, it has the ad-
vantage of being able to draw upon the
knowledge and information of the directors
and officers of its 12 banks and 24 branches
in formulating and carrying out credit and
monetary policies.
Board of Governors. The Board of Gov-
ernors, as you know, is composed of seven
members appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, each for a term
of 14 years. In appointing the members of
the Board, the President is required to give
due regard to a fair representation of the
financial, agricultural, industrial, and com-
mercial interests, as well as the geographical
divisions of the country. From among these
members the President designates a Chair-
man and a Vice Chairman for terms of four
years. Some of the functions of the Board
of Governors are (1) to exercise supervision
over the Federal Reserve Banks; (2) to fix,
within statutory limits, the reserves which
members banks are required to maintain
against their deposit liabilities; (3) to review
and determine the discount rates which are
established biweekly at each Federal Reserve
Bank, subject to approval of the Board in
Washington; (4) to participate, as members
of the Federal Open Market Committee, in
determining policies whereby the System in-
fluences the availability of credit primarily
through the purchase or sale of Government
securities in the open market; (5) to fix
margin requirements on loans on stock ex-
change collateral; and (6) to perform var-
ious supervisory functions with respect to
commercial banks that are members of the
System and to administer Federal Reserve,
Holding Company, and other legislation.
Federal Reserve Banks. Each Federal Re-
serve Bank has a board of nine directors, of
whom six are elected by the member banks.
Of these, three are bankers, one from a large,
one from a medium, and one from a small
bank. Three more must not be bankers,
but must be engaged in some nonbanking
business. The other three members are ap-
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pointed by the Board of Governors in Wash-
ington, which also designates one to be the
Chairman and another the Deputy Chair-
man. None of these three may be an officer,
director, employee, or stockholder of any
bank. The directors of a Reserve Bank
supervise its affairs. Subject to approval of
the Board of Governors, they appoint the
President and First Vice President. Subject
to review and determination by the Board
of Governors, they establish discount rates.
The stock of each Federal Reserve Bank
is held by the member banks of its district.
This stock does not have the normal attri-
butes of corporate stock; rather, it represents
a required subscription to the capital of the
Reserve Bank, dividends being fixed by law
at 6 per cent. The residual interest in the
surplus of the Federal Reserve Banks be-
longs to the United States Government, not
to the Bank's stockholders.
Federal Open Market Committee. The
Federal Open Market Committee consists,
according to law, of the seven members of
the Board of Governors, together with five
Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks.
Four of these five Presidents serve on a
rotating basis; the fifth, the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a
permanent member of the Committee. Since
June 1955, when its Executive Committee
was abolished, this Committee has usually
met at three-week intervals to direct the sale
and purchase of securities in the open
market. In practice, all 12 Presidents at-
tend these meetings and participate freely
in the discussion, although only those who
are members of the Committee vote.
Federal Advisory Council. The Federal
Reserve Act also provides for a Federal Ad-
visory Council of 12 members. One is
elected by the Board of each Reserve Bank
for a term of one year. The Council is re-
quired by law to meet in Washington at least
four times each year. It is authorized to
confer directly with the Board of Governors
respecting general business conditions and
to make recommendations concerning mat-
ters within the Board's jurisdiction.
Judging economic trends. The work of the
System requires a continuous study and ex-
ercise of judgment in order to be alert to the
way the economy is trending and what Fed-
eral Reserve actions will best contribute to
sustained economic growth. Such decisions
are often hard to make because of the exist-
ence of cross-currents in the economy. Even
in generally prosperous times, some parts
of the economy may not fare as well as
others. Credit policy must, however, fit the
general situation and not reflect unduly
either the condition of certain industries ex-
periencing poor business, or that of other
industries enjoying a boom. Residential
construction illustrates this point. In 1956
and so far in 1957 demand pressures on
available resources have been generally
strong and prices have been moving up, but
housing construction has receded considera-
bly from its 1955 peak. The home-building
industry undoubtedly could supply housing
at a faster rate than is now prevailing. But
even at the current volume, building costs
continue to increase. The prices of some
building materials have fallen, it is true, but
the over-all cost of housing construction has
increased appreciably even in the face of
moderately lower demand. The explana-
tion is to be found in the fact that expendi-
tures for all major types of construction
except residential have been maintained at
or above record levels. This example shows
why credit policy must take account of the
over-all situation, and cannot be deterred un-
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duly by special cases that are not typical of
the whole.
Another factor complicating economic in-
terpretation is that even in a period of broad
advance and upward pressure on prices,
there may be lulls when conditions seem to
be stabilizing and the next turn of events is
difficult to appraise.
Purposes. The objective of the System is
always the same—to promote monetary and
credit conditions that will foster sustained
economic growth together with stability in
the value of the dollar. This goal may be
thought of in human terms. The first part
may be considered as concerned with job
opportunities for wage earners; the latter as
directed to protecting those who depend
upon savings or fixed incomes, or who rely
upon pension rights. In fact, however, a
realization of both aims is vital to all of us.
They are inseparable. Price stability is es-
sential to sustainable growth. Inflation
fosters maladjustments. In some periods
these broad aims call for encouraging credit
expansion; in others, for restraint on the
growth of credit. The latter is what is re-
quired at present, for clearly the most critical
economic problem now facing this country
is that of inflation, or put in the terms of the
man on the street, it is the rising cost of
living.
THE CURRENT PROBLEM OF INFLATION
This problem is far different from the one
that beset us during the depressed 1930's,
and left an indelible impression on our think-
ing. The problem then was one of drastic
deflation with widespread unemployment,
both of men and material resources. To-
day's problem has persisted through the
years since World War II. It consists of
inflationary price increases and the eco-
nomic imbalances that have resulted.
This is the overriding problem that faces
the Federal Reserve System today, for a
spiral of mounting prices and wages seeks
more and more financing. It creates
demands for funds in excess of savings, and
since these demands cannot be satisfied in
full, the result is mounting interest rates and
a condition of so-called tight money. If the
gap between investment demands and
available savings should be filled by creating
additional bank money, the spiral of infla-
tion which tends to become cumulative and
self-perpetuating would be given further
impetus. If the Federal Reserve System
were a party to that process, it would betray
its trust.
Conflicting views on causes. There is much
current discussion of the origin of inflation-
ary pressures. Some believe they reflect a
recurrence of demand-pulls, similar to those
present in the earlier postwar period. Others
believe they originate in a cost-push en-
gendered by administered pricing policies
and wage agreements that violate the limits
of tolerance set by advances in productivity.
These distinctions present an oversim-
plification of the problem. Inflation is a
process in which rising costs and prices
mutually interact upon each other over time
with a spiral effect. Inflation always has
the attributes, therefore, of a cost-push. At
the same time, demand must always be suffi-
cient to keep the spiral moving. Otherwise
the marking up of prices in one sector of
the economy would be offset by a reduction
of prices in other sectors.
There is much to be said for the view that
contractual or other arrangements designed
as shelters or hedges from inflation have the
effect of quickening its tempo. The 5 per
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cent rise in the cost of living which we have
experienced over the last two years has
probably reflected and been reflected in more
rapidly rising wage costs because of the
prevalence of cost of living clauses in many
modern wage contracts. Cost-plus contracts
tend to have the same quickening effect on
the inflationary spiral.
The spiral is also, however, a demand
spiral. At each point of time in the devel-
opment of the inflationary spiral, there must
be sufficient demand to take the higher
priced goods off the market and thus keep
the process moving.
The inflationary spiral. The workings of
the spiral of inflation are illustrated by the
economy of the moment. As has been
brought out at some of the earlier hearings
of this Committee, we are now faced with
the seeming paradox that prices are expected
to continue to rise, even though the specific
bottlenecks in capacity that impeded the
growth of production in 1956 have now been
largely relieved, and investment in produc-
tive facilities continues at very high levels.
Houses, automobiles, household appliances,
and other consumer goods, as well as most
basic materials, are all readily available—
at a price. The problem is no longer one of
specific shortages or bottlenecks causing
prices of individual commodities to be bid
up because of limited availability but rather
it is one of broad general pressure on all of
our resources. In other words, aggregate
demand is in excess of aggregate availabili-
ties of these resources at existing prices.
Taking the situation as a whole, as in-
dividuals, corporations, and governments
proceed with their expenditure plans, but-
tressed by borrowed funds, they are in the
position of attempting to bid the basic fac-
tors of production—land, labor, and capital
—away from each other and in the process
the general level of costs and prices is in-
evitably pushed upward. Recently, this
general pressure has been expressing itself
particularly in rising prices for services as
compared with goods. Despite the existence
in some lines of reduced employment and
slack demand, many employers now face
rising costs when they seek to expand activ-
ity by adding appreciably to the number
employed. Often, the additional manpower
required has to be bid away from other em-
ployers. As a result, many current plans
for further expansion of capacity place great
emphasis on more efficient, more productive
equipment rather than on more manpower.
This generalized pressure on resources
comes to a head in financial markets in the
form of a shortage of saving in relation to
the demand for funds. A considerable vol-
ume of expenditure is financed at all times
out of borrowed funds. When these funds
are borrowed from others who have cur-
tailed their own expenditures, no additional
demand for resources is generated. On bal-
ance, however, demands for funds by those
who have wanted to borrow money to spend
in excess of their current incomes have out-
run savings. Those who have saved by
limiting their current expenditures, and thus
made funds available for lending, have still
not kept pace with the desire of govern-
ments, businesses, and individuals to borrow
in order to spend.
Just as an intense general pressure on
available resources manifests itself in rising
wages and prices, a deficiency of savings
relative to the demand for borrowed money
manifests itself in an increase in the price
of credit. In such circumstances, interest
rates are bound to rise. The rise in rates
might be temporarily held down by creating
new bank money to meet borrowing de-
mands, but this, as I have said, would add
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fuel to inflation and bring about further in-
creases in demands. In the end, as prices
rose ever faster, interest rates could not be
held down. In summary, whatever the spe-
cial features of the current inflation, the
important fact is that it is here, and that it
has created demands for borrowed funds in
excess of financial savings, even though
these have grown appreciably. Any attempt
to substitute newly created bank money for
this deficiency in savings can only aggravate
the problem and make matters worse.
EFFECTS OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES
The response to higher interest rates is com-
plex. One result is that some would-be
borrowers draw on cash balances to finance
projected expenditures or lenders draw on
their balances to lend at the higher rates,
thus reducing their liquidity and increasing
the turnover of the existing money supply.
In recent years, with the large volume of
Federal Government securities outstanding,
many holders of these securities—both in-
stitutions and individuals—have liquidated
their holdings in order to shift funds to other
uses. This has been an important influence
in bringing about the decline in bond prices.
To the extent that accumulated cash bal-
ances or other past savings can be used
more actively, expenditures remain high rel-
ative to available resources and prices tend
to rise, but the reduced financial liquidity
eventually exerts restraint on borrowing and
spending.
Another result of higher interest costs,
together with greater difficulty in obtaining
loans, is that many potential borrowers re-
vise or postpone their borrowing plans. To
the extent that expenditures are revised or
deferred, inflationary pressures are reduced.
The most constructive result is the en-
couragement of a volume of savings and
investment that permits continued expan-
sion of productive facilities at a rate con-
sistent with growing consumption demands.
Only in this way can the standard of living
for a growing population be improved and
the value of savings be maintained.
Such constructive adaptations, if made
in time at the onset of inflationary pressures,
need not be large in order to restore balance
between prospective demands and the re-
sources available to meet them. It is es-
sential, however, that the adjustment be
made. Otherwise prospective expenditures
will continue to exceed the resources avail-
able and the pressure of excess demand will
foster an inflationary spiral.
EXPECTATIONS OF CONTINUING INFLATION
Once such a spiral is set in motion it has
a strong tendency to feed upon itself. If
prices generally are expected to rise, incen-
tives to save and to lend are diminished and
incentives to borrow and to spend are in-
creased. Consumers who would normally
be savers are encouraged to postpone saving
and, instead, purchase goods of which they
are not in immediate need. Businessmen,
likewise, are encouraged to anticipate
growth requirements for new plant and
equipment. Thus, spending is increased on
both counts. But, because the economy is
already operating at high levels, further in-
creases in spending are not matched by
corresponding increases in production. In-
stead, the increased spending for goods and
services tends to develop a spiral of mount-
ing prices, wages, and costs.
Unfortunately, during the past year, as
price indexes gradually rose, some segments
of the community apparently became re-
conciled to the prospects of a "creeping"
if not a "runaway" inflation. One of the
baneful effects of inflation stems from the
expectation of inflation. While a price in-
crease, in itself, may cause serious disloca-
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tions and inequities, other and more serious
effects occur if the price rise brings with it
an expectation of still other increases. Ex-
pectations clearly have a great influence on
economic and financial decisions. In fact,
decisions to spend or to invest too much in
a given time are a direct cause of inflation.
Also, if further inflation is expected, spec-
ulative commitments are encouraged and
the pattern of investment and other spend-
ing—the decisions on what kinds of things
to buy—will change in a way that threatens
balanced growth.
"Creeping inflation." The unwarranted as-
sumption that "creeping inflation" is inevit-
able deserves comment. This term has been
used by various writers to mean a gradual
rise in prices which, they suggest, could be
held to a moderate rate, averaging perhaps
2 per cent a year. The idea of prices rising
2 per cent in a year may not seem too star-
tling—in fact, during the past year, average
prices have increased by more than 2 per
cent—but this concept of creeping inflation
implies that a price rise of this kind would
be expected to continue indefinitely. Ac-
cording to those who espouse this view,
rising prices would then be the normal
expectation and the Federal Reserve ac-
cordingly would no longer strive to keep
the value of money stable but would simply
try to temper the rate of depreciation. Busi-
ness and investment decisions would be
made in the light of this prospect.
Such a prospect would work incalculable
hardship. If monetary policy were directed
with a view to permitting this kind of in-
flation—even if it were possible to control
it so that prices rose no faster than 2 per
cent a year—the price level would double
every 35 years and the value of the dollar
would be cut in half each generation.
Losses would thus be inflicted upon millions
of people, pensioners, Government em-
ployees, all who have fixed incomes, includ-
ing people who have part of their assets in
savings accounts and long-term bonds, and
other assets of fixed dollar value. The
heaviest losers would be those unable to
protect themselves by escalator clauses or
other offsets against prices that were steadily
creeping up.
Moreover the expectation of inflation
would react on the composition of savings.
A large part of the savings of the country
is mobilized in savings deposits and similar
claims that call for some stated amount of
dollars. If people generally come to feel
that inflation is inevitable, they will not save
in this form unless they are paid a much
higher interest premium to compensate them
for the depreciation of their saved dollars.
It is for this reason that it is impossible, in
a period of demand in excess of savings, to
maintain lower interest rates through a pol-
icy of "easy" credit. The country is exper-
iencing a period of generally high employ-
ment in which investment outlays remain
high, but if fears of inflation cause people
to spend more of their incomes and save
less, the result could only be more rapid
inflation and still less saving in relation to
income. Such saving as remained, further-
more, would be less and less in the form of
loanable funds to finance homes, highways,
school construction, and other community
needs.
Effects on productive enterprise. An in-
flationary psychology also impairs the effi-
ciency of productive enterprise—through
which our standard of living has made un-
paralleled strides. In countries that have
had rapid or runaway inflations, this process
has become so painfully obvious that no
doubt remained as to what was happening
to productivity. In the making of decisions
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on whether or not to increase inventory, or
make a capital investment, or engage in
some other business operation, the question
of whether the operation would increase the
profit from inflation became far more im-
portant than whether the proposed venture
would enable the firm to sell more goods or
to produce them at lower cost. The incen-




Why have real wages in this country risen
to the highest levels in the world, thus per-
mitting our standard of living to rise cor-
respondingly? Certainly, it is not just be-
cause wages have risen as the cost of living
has risen. The big source of increase has
been the increasing productivity of our na-
tional economy. Real incomes have gone
up because the total size of the pie, out of
which everybody receives his share, has
grown so magnificently. What has enabled
the productivity of the American economy
to achieve the levels that make all this pos-
sible? One vital factor has been the striving
by so many people, each in his own field,
for better and more efficient ways of doing
things. Equally important has been the will-
ingness to set aside a part of current income
to provide the machines, tools, and other
equipment for further progress. Both are
essential if our standard of living and mate-
rial welfare are to go on advancing.
EFFECTS OF INFLATION
Inflation does not simply take something
away from one group of our population and
give it to another group. Universally, the
standard of living is hurt, and countless peo-
ple injured, not only those who are depend-
ent on annuities or pensions, or whose
savings are in the form of bonds or life in-
surance contracts. The great majority of
those who operate their own businesses or
farms, or own common stocks or real estate,
or even those who have cost of living agree-
ments whereby their wages will be raised,
cannot escape the effects of speculative in-
fluences that accompany inflation and impair
reliance upon business judgments and com-
petitive efficiency.
Finally, in addition to these economic
effects, we should not overlook the way that
inflation could damage our social and politi-
cal structure. Money would no longer serve
as a standard of value for long-term savings.
Consequently, those who would turn out to
have savings in their old age would tend to
be the slick and clever rather than the hard-
working and thrifty. Fundamental faith in
the fairness of our institutions and our Gov-
ernment would deteriorate. The underlying
strength of our country and of our political
institutions rests upon faith in the fairness
of these institutions, in the fact that produc-
tive effort and hard work will earn an ap-
propriate economic reward. That faith can-
not be maintained in the face of continuing
chronic inflation.
There is no validity whatever in the idea
that any inflation, once accepted, can be
confined to moderate proportions. Once the
assumption is made that a gradual increase
in prices is to be expected, and this assump-
tion becomes a part of everybody's expecta-
tions, keeping a rising price level under
control becomes incomparably more difficult
than the problem of maintaining stability
when that is the clearly expressed goal of
public policy. Creeping inflation is neither
a rational nor a realistic alternative to sta-
bility of the general price level.
"PEGGING" THE MARKET
It has been suggested, from time to time,
that the Federal Reserve System could re-
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lieve current pressures in money and capital
markets without, at the same time, contrib-
uting to inflationary pressures. These sug-
gestions usually involve Federal Reserve
support of the United States Government
securities market through one form or an-
other of pegging operations. There is no
way for the Federal Reserve System to peg
the price of Government bonds at any given
level unless it stands ready to buy all of the
bonds offered to it at that price. This proc-
ess inevitably provides additional funds for
the banking system, permits the expansion
of loans and investments and a comparable
increase in the money supply—a process
sometimes referred to as monetization of the
public debt. The amount of the inflationary
force generated by such a policy depends to
some extent upon the demand pressures in
the market at the time. It would be danger-
ously inflationary under conditions that pre-
vail today. In the present circumstances the
Reserve System could not peg the Govern-
ment securities market without, at the same
time, igniting explosive inflationary fuel.
DO RISING INTEREST RATES
ADD TO INFLATION?
We must be clear in viewing these relation-
ships to distinguish cause from effect and
not to confuse them. It is sometimes said
that rising interest rates, by increasing the
cost of doing business, lead to higher prices
and thus contribute to inflation. This view
is based upon an inadequate conception of
the role of interest rates in the economy,
and upon a mistaken idea of how interest
costs compare with total costs. In munici-
pal government budgets, it is about 2 per
cent; in many utilities, it is 3 to 5 per cent.
Thus, as an element of cost, interest rates
are relatively small; but as a reflection of
demand pressures in markets for funds, in-
terest rates are highly sensitive. As previ-
ously explained, rising interest rates result
primarily from an excess of borrowing de-
mands over the available supply of savings.
Since these demands are stimulated by in-
flation, under these circumstances rising in-
terest rates are an effect of inflationary
pressures, not a cause. Any attempt to
prevent such a rise by creating new money
would lead to a much more rapid rise in
prices and in costs than would result from
any likely increase in interest rates. Such
an attempt, moreover, would not remove
the need for a fundamental adjustment in
the relation between saving and consump-
tion and would probably fail in its purpose
of stabilizing interest rates.
BASIC FACTORS IN RECENT
INFLATIONARY PRESSURES
A major cause of recent inflationary pres-
sures has been the attempt to crowd into
this period a volume of investment greater
than the economy could take without cur-
tailing consumption more than consumers
have been willing to do. In fact, there has
been some increase in consumption on bor-
rowed funds. Increases in interest rates
naturally come about under such conditions;
they are the economy's means of protecting
itself against such excessive bunching of
investment or the building up of an unsus-
tainable rate of consumption. While the
effect of a moderate change in interest rates
on the cost of goods currently being pro-
duced and sold is small and relatively un-
important, changes in interest rates do as-
sume importance as a cost in the planning
of new investment outlays. These costs do
not affect current operations or add to up-
ward price pressures to any substantial ex-
tent. They do tend to deter the undertaking
of new investment projects and to keep the
amount of investment spending that is being
undertaken in line with the economy's ability
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to produce investment goods. To maintain
artificially low interest rates under these con-
ditions, without introducing any other force
to restrain investment, would be to invite
an unbridled investment boom, inflation,
and an inevitable collapse later.
It is necessary to emphasize that there are
many influences, other than monetary pol-
icies and interest rates, that affect the volume
of consumption, investment, and saving and
their relationships. Monetary policies op-
erate directly through the volume of bank
credit and bank-created money. The vol-
ume of current saving out of income and
the uses made of new and outstanding sav-
ings have a more important bearing upon
the availability of investment funds than
bank credit. Interest rates, therefore, are
influenced by the relationship between in-
vestment demands and the availability of
savings, independently of monetary policies.
Interference with these relationships through
monetary policies, in fact, may prevent nec-
essary and healthy adjustments that help
to maintain equilibrium in economic growth.
IN A NUTSHELL
A. An inflationary spiral is always charac-
terized by:
1. An interaction between rising costs and ris-
ing prices; and
2. An increase in over-all effective demand suf-
ficient to keep the spiral going. As prices generally
keep rising, a larger and larger volume of demand
(in dollar terms) is needed to sustain the same
volume of transactions (in physical terms).
As long as it persists, therefore, an infla-
tion will always show evidence of both de-
mand-pulls and cost-pushes with their rela-
tive manifestations shifting as the inflation
runs its course.
B. The tempo of interaction between
rising costs and rising prices will be speeded
up if the situation is characterized by:
1. The release of a previously created over-
hang of pent-up money demand (such as existed
when direct controls broke down or were relaxed
at the end of the war).
2. The creation in volume of new money de-
mand through excessive credit expansion and/or
activation of existing cash balances (such as hap-
pened when war broke out in Korea).
3. The widespread existence in the economy of
escalators which act automatically to transfer ris-
ing costs or prices into rising prices and costs
(cost of living clauses in collective bargaining
agreements, cost-plus contracts, etc.).
4. The degree to which a speculative psychology
backed by effective demand pervades business
decisions.
C. The tempo of interaction between
costs and prices will also be affected by the
degree to which administered prices and
wage rates are prevalent in the economy.
These effects are not always in the same
direction. The net effect of the many and
various factors influencing administered
prices and wages sometimes tend to slow
up and sometimes to accelerate price move-
ments, depending upon the particular cir-
cumstances.
D. Whatever the mix of the above in-
gredients, an inflation once under way will
tend to persist as long as the credit neces-
sary to finance the rising level of costs and
prices is forthcoming. Credit may be sup-
plied through new bank credit expansion
or by activation of already existing money.
E. Whatever its antecedent characteris-
tics, an inflation will tend to feed upon itself
and be accentuated once the investing and
saving public come to think of further in-
flation as the prospect.
F. It is the nature of inflation hedges to
act as aggravating rather than equilibrating
factors.
G. No one suffers more than the little
man from the ravages of inflation.
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H. A monetary authority dedicated to
promoting the public welfare must not relax
restraints in the face of continuing infla-
tionary pressures, since any efforts to relax
merely add to the forces tending to keep the
inflation in motion.
WHAT MORE CAN BE DONE?
How, then, may further inflation be re-
strained? Bluntly, the answer is to be found
in a moderation of spending, both govern-
mental and private, until the demands for
funds are balanced by savings. This pru-
dence must be coupled with sound fiscal
policy, which means a larger budget surplus
as well as effective monetary policy to re-
strain the growth of bank credit.
Among the factors influencing saving and
consumption are those fiscal policies relating
to taxes and governmental budgets. These
require special attention because they are
not as responsive to changes in the availa-
bility of credit and interest rates as are pri-
vate activities. Untimely fiscal policies can
create or aggravate imbalance in the eco-
nomy and thus dilute the effectiveness of
monetary policies. On the other hand, fiscal
measures that help to maintain balance can
reduce the degree of restraint that monetary
policies might otherwise have to exert.
Experience over the centuries has demon-
strated that there is no tolerable alternative
to adequate fiscal and monetary policies,
operating in an environment of open, com-
petitive markets under our system of human
freedoms. Neither an economic dictator-
ship nor complacent acceptance of creeping
inflation is a rational or tolerable way of life
for the American people.
There is no panacea, no magical means of
assuring orderly economic growth, nor are
we much more likely in the future than in
the past to achieve perfect performance in
the timing and execution of policy and ac-
tion. We have every reason to believe,
nevertheless, that we can discern and follow
the right path. Thus, it is clear that the
present situation calls both for a larger
budgetary surplus than we have had or have
in prospect, and a continuance of restraint
upon creation of new supplies of money.
ACTION REQUIRED
Let us not follow the defeatist path of
believing that widespread unemployment is
the alternative to inflation.
There is no question that the Federal
Government and the American people, pull-
ing together, have the power to stabilize the
cost of living. The only question is whether
there is the will to do so.
If the will is there, and it is demonstrated
convincingly to the American people, the
cost of living can be stabilized, interest rates
will relax, and a sufficient volume of savings
will be encouraged to provide for the eco-
nomic growth needed in this generation and
the next.
This Committee and the Congress can
contribute greatly to that end by declaring
resolutely—so that all the world will know
—that stabilization of the cost of living is
a primary aim of Federal economic policy.
The goal of price stability, now implicit
in the Employment Act, can be made ex-
plicit by a straightforward declaration and
directive to all agencies of the Government
that anti-inflationary actions are to be taken
promptly whenever the cost of living begins
to rise.
The Executive and Legislative branches
of Government, in conjunction, can assure
adjustment of Federal revenues and expend-
itures so that, in times when total spending
threatens to burst the bounds of capacity and
drive up the cost of living, the Federal
Federal Reserve Bulletin: August 1957WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST INFLATION 877
Government will set an example of restraint
in outlays and at the same time produce a
surplus to counter inflationary pressures
from any quarter.
The Congress and the Executive can take
steps to assure that free and vigorous com-
petition is maintained in all segments of the
economy as the bedrock of our free enter-
prise system.
The Federal Reserve System, itself a crea-
tion of the Congress, can—and I assure you
that it will—make every effort to check
excesses in the field of money and credit that
threaten the cost of living and thus under-
mine sustained prosperity and growth of our
economy.
In all of these ways we can, if we have the
will, set the face of the nation so resolutely
against inflation as to keep that enemy from
our gates.
No greater tragedy, short of war, could
befall the free world than to have our coun-
try surrender to the easy delusion that a little
inflation, year after year, is either inevitable
or tolerable. For that way lies ultimate
economic chaos and incalculable human
suffering that would undermine faith in the
institutions of free men.
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